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DESUETUDE v. NORTH DAKOTA GAMBLING
Today, our legislatures are turning out an ever increasing
number of statutes to cope with the needs of our society. Many
of our legislatures' earlier endeavors have fallen into disuse, and
the statutes no longer serve the purpose they were intended to
serve. What happens in a society that permits its laws to become
obsolescent? This will be the central question and thesis of this
article.
INTRODUCTION
The process of desuetude to most is an unfamiliar procedure.
In theory, desuetude appears to operate primarily as a possible
method by which a society may deal with obsolete statutes. To
acquire a better understanding of the doctrine, one must examine
its acceptance and non-acceptance into various systems of law.
The early Romans, who ascribed to the perfection of a univer-
sal law of all mankind - jus gentium - regarded custom, when
practiced by a majority as being equal to statutory law." Cus-
tom could therefore, be capable of superseding a previous statute. 2
This Roman notion is best stated in a passage found in Justinian's
Digest:
Long continued custom is not improperly regarded as equiva-
lent to a statute, and what is . . . established by usage is
law . . . Wherefore very rightly this also is held, that
statutes may be abrogated not only by a vote of the legis-
lator, but also by desuetude with the tacit consent of all.8
In line with Roman thinking were the nineteenth century Ger-
man jurists of the Historical School. Their leader, Savigny, demon-
strated that the written law and the law of the people were
products of the Volksgeist.4 Both, therefore, were given equal
1. W. BucKLAm, A TEXT BOOK op RoM&N LAw, 52 (1921).
2. W. HAMMOND, THB SANDARS' INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 75 (American Edition
1876).
3. DiazsT 8.92.L
4. F. SAVzoiGr, STRMM or Tu MODzRN RowAN LAw 35 (Holloway Tranal. 1867).
-When the customary law contradict[s] a written law, the principle of equality direct[s]
the preference always to be given to the newer of these two laws without distinction be-
,tween written and customary." Id. at 156.
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dignity.5 Savigny goes -on to say, however, that not all desuetude
statutes will fail because of a lack of enforcement. Rather, there
must be found a "plurality of uniform and uninterrupted acts
throughout a long period of time."6
In the common law nation of England, one finds that the doc-
trine of desuetude was never accepted. As early as 1409, one reads:
in the time of our Lord the King, it is ordained that
all statutes made in the time of the king's ancestors and
not repealed shall be kept and observed. Therefore, if this
statute was never repealed, it still remains in force.7
Modern English cases also agree that a statute may never be
aborgated under any circumstance, even where there has been
widespread and long established non-observance.8 Some legal
writers have attributed England's rejection of the doctrine to the
influence of the legal philosopher Austin.9 For with Austin,
"whatever the Sovereign commands is law, and it remains that
quality even though a particular command may be disobeyed or
left unforced."10 Therefore, it appears that regardless of any in-
justices that may arise, the English will consistently enforce the
statutes before them.
One who has followed the development of American law, with
its roots deeply embedded in English tradition, would suspect that
desuetude, as in England, was never accepted. There are, how-
ever, early American cases that accepted the theory of the doc-
trine, but these were in the minority.11 Recently, there has been
some serious consideration that possibly an American statute,
weary from neglect, can become worn out from non-use.12 This
change in attitude might be attributed to at least two reasons.
The first reason is the legislature itself. If our legislatures had
the means and the time to consider their past acts, as well as
their new legislation, the books would not contain as many desuetu-
dal statutes. However, as Professor Johnsen points out:
5. Ia. at 138.
6. Id. at 148.
7. Y. B. Mich. 11, Hn. 4, pl. 8b (1409).
8. 44 ENGLISH AND EMPIE DIGEST, Statutes § 2086-90, Ef/ect of Disues of Statutes
370 (1965). See also, S. THORNE, A DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSICION AND UNDERSTANDIGS
OF STATUTES (1942).
9. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IOWA L. Rmv.
389, 409 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Bonfield].
10. .,ON FULLER, PROBLEMS o JURISPRUDENCE 108 (1949).
11. Porter's Appeal% 30 Pa. 496 (1858); O'Hanlon v. Myers, 10 Rich. L. 128 (S.C.
1856); Hill v. Smith, 1 Morris 95 (Iowa 1840); Wright v. Crane 13 S. & B. 447 (Pa.
1826); James v. Commonwealth, 12 S. & R. 220 (Pa. 1825).
12. Bonfield, supra note 9; L. and W. Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IOWA L.
RPv. 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Rodgers]; A. BxcKEL, THr LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
(1962).
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[F]or some obscure reason in the American character,
laws are rarely repealed; they are allowed simply to lapse
in observance. It is far more difficult to get any legislature,
including Congress, to take an interest and initiative in re-
pealing a law than it is to enact one. 18
The end result is more and more desuetudal statutes and no
method by which we can eliminate them. Such a situation leads,
as we will find out later, to various injustices. Therefore, it is
suggested that there should be some "judicially enforcible limita-
tions on the application of obsolete statutes.""
The second reason, which is germane to many obsolete statutes,
especially to the gambling statutes in North Dakota, is the fact
that many of these obsolete statutes are concerned with public
morality. These statutes were enacted at a time when public sen-
timent supported a strict enforcement of the Sabbath, the sup-
pression of all gambling, severe punishment of drunkenness, blas-
phemy and indecent speech.1 5 Pressures that would ordinarily
strive to repeal these obsolete laws may never develop. As Arnold
suggests:
[t]hey survive in order to satisfy m o r a 1 objections to es-
tablished modes of conduct. They are unenforced, because
we want to continue our conduct, and unrepealed because
we want to preserve our morals.16
If then, the legislature is unable to repeal old legislation because
of the moral dilemma presented, one may have to consider other
avenues of approach.
The foregoing are only some of the considerations that have
led legal writers of today to conclude that a closer examination
of the application of the doctrine of desuetude is warranted.
AMERICAN DESUETUDE
In analyzing the necessary elements that are required for des-
uetude in American jurisprudence, we find that a mere disuse is
not enough. 17 Professor Bonfield lists the following prerequisites:
(1) A violation of the statute must be "prevalent and
visible," so that the failure to apply the act is a "prod-
13. JOHNsEN, LAW ENFORcsMENT 340 (1930).
14. Bonfield, supra note 9, at 394.
15. M. Neudec, Morality Legislation in North Dakota 1889-1914, 1964 (unpublished
thesis in Chester Fritz Library at the University of North Dakota). See also, J. Petry,
Morality Legislation In NorthDakota 1920-54, 1967 (unpublished thesis in Chester Fritz
Library at the University of North Dakota).
16. T uma.w ABNow, THU SYMBOlS OF GOV'NMENT 160 (1935).
17. See note 24, infra.
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uct of a conscious administrative policy of completely
ignoring that provision's breach."
(2) A failure to apply the statute must be "knowable and
apparent" to the community to which it is directed.
(3) There must be an absolute omission to enforce the
statute for a sufficient period of time, such that it is
clear the non-enforcement does not reflect a transitional
or unsettled policy."'
While most legal systems that recognize desuetude would agree
with Mr. Bonfield's first two requirements, they would be less
stringent on the last requirement. 19 Under Mr. Bonfield's analysis,
it would be difficult for one to establish that a particular law was
not in a transitional stage or was no longer an unsettled policy.
Other legal systems would require that the "practice be of such
a duration and generality" as to enable the inference of the com-
munity to set up a "counter law or establish a quasi-repeal."20
This approach appears to be more realistic. Emphasis here is on
what the community in fact has accepted as their "living law."
The exact status of desuetude in American law today is un-
certain. Sutherland concludes that in no way can the American
courts decree that a validly enacted statute will be rendered in-
effective by non-use.21 And he has the support of a number of
decisions.
22
On the other hand, there are early cases that tended to sup-
port desuetude.28  Furthermore, there is authority that a court
may disregard a statute when conditions have so changed that
the present enforcement of the law would not advance its original




It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of the United
States has never resolved the desuetude question directly. In 1961,
however, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority in Poe
v. Ullmzn25 stated that the failure of Connecticut to enforce its
anti-birth control statutes over a period of some eighty years
amounted to "an undeviating policy of nullification." Did he mean
18. Bonfield, aupra note 9, at 419-20.
19. Id. at 403-05. Bee also, Philip, Some Reflections on Desuetude, 43 JURmD. R1v. 260
(1981).
20. Philip, supra note 19.
21. 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2034 (Horack 3 ed. 1943).
22. Dist. of Col. v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953); State v. Cranston, 59 Idaho
561. 85 P.2d 682 (1938) ; Shutt v. State, 173 Ind. 689, 89 N.E. 6 (1909) ; State v. Nease,
46 Ore. 433, 80 P. 897 (1905) ; Pearson v. Int'l Distillery, 72 Iowa 348, 34 N.W. 1 (1887).
23. Cases cited note 11, supra.
24. Philip v. Boise Street Car Co., 61 Idaho 740, 107 P.2d 148, 151 (1940); of.
Humthlet v. Reeves, 212 Ga. 8, 90 S.E.2d 14 (1955).
25. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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that the statute had fallen to obsolesence through a long period
of non-enforcement, and as such, could not be enforced? The
court seemed to emphasize the very elements of desuetude, but
yet never directly asserted that their reasoning was based on any
desuetudal doctrine.
An interesting observation by Bonfield, in reference to the
earlier decisions in this area, is that,
most of the authority responsible for the American repudi-
ation of desuetude are state court cases. . . . As a result,
their failure to deal with questions of due process and equal
protection is easily explainable. It also weakens their signifi-
cance as precedent and induces a closer scrutiny of the
more recent judicial excursions into this area.
THE PROBLEMS
Why does the situation warrant a closer scrutiny to determine
the possible application of desuetude? The answer lies in this
paper's central question. What happens in a society that permits
its laws to become obsolete? In short, such a society propagates
the seeds on injustice and lays the ground work for a general dis-
respect for the law.
To begin with, consider the discriminatory practices that may
and do arise in defiance of the guarantee of equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
On the other hand, there is a situation in which a statute by its
terms requires general enforcement, the legislature intended it,
and the law enforcement agencies are enforcing the law univer-
sally or in a reasonably selective manner. Here, there is no prob-
lem, no discrimination, and no denial of equal protection. On the
other hand, there is the situation involving a desuetudal statute
such as the gambling statute in North Dakota, where the statute
requires general enforcement, the legislature is silent, and the law
enforcement agencies, for the most part, no longer enforce the
law against particular classes, but yet, sporadically apply the law
to other classes. Is this a denial of equal protection? In viewing
the Yick Wo2 case, it would be.
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so
as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination be-
tween persons in similar circumstances, material to their
26. Bonfield, auro a note 9, at 429.
27. 113 U.T. 856 (1886).
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rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the pro-
hibition of the Constitution.
2
If the above is true, then why not invoke the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when confronted with desuetudal statutes? The answer is
that the present judiciary machinery could provide adequate pro-
tection, but in reality does not. This has been attributed to at
least two reasons.
First, the courts are reluctant to interfere with ordinary dis-
cretionary practices by the law enforcement agencies. 29 As a re-
sult, Rodgers points out that, "many of the illegitimate consider-
ations governing enforcement discretion escapes judicial notice." s
A second reason is the difficult burden of proof required to main-
tain a defense of unequal protection in a desuetudal situation. De-
cisions suggest that only in cases where there is shown to be
an element of intentional and unreasonable discrimination will the
Fourteenth Amendment protection apply.81 There are other cases
which go further and suggest that a denial of equal protection
is limited only to cases where class discrimination is established.
The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforce-
ment is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Even
though the statistics in this case might imply a policy of
selective enforcement, it was not stated that the selection
was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Therefore,
grounds supporting a finding of a denial of equal protection
were not alleged.82
If a person is required not only to prove that the discrimination
was intentional and unreasonable, but also that such discrimination
was directed toward a specific class to which he belonged, we
find that the defendant has a difficult burden to meet. It should
be remembered that a mere failure to prosecute other offenders
is no basis for finding a denial of equal protection.8 3
This is not to say that a defense of equal protection against
the use of an obsolete statute is impossible. Rather, in reality,
28. Id. at 878-74.
29. RodgerM supra note 12, at 9-10. See also, Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to In-
voke the Oriminal Process, 69 YALe L. J. 643 (1960).
30. Rodgers, supr note 12, at 10.
31. Boynton v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp., 60 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1932); U.S.
v. Elliot, 266 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
32. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 346 (1962); Accord, Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1
1944). See also, material printed by the LIsLATrV0 RxzPnnCn SERvIcE, THE CONsTrTU-
TiON Or THE UNITED STATEs Or AMEmPcA, S. Deoc. No. 39, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 1292 (1964).
"Except where discrimination on the basis of race or nationality is shown, few police
regulations have been found unconstitutional on [eQual protection] ground[s]." Id.
33. Moss v. Hornig, 814 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963) ; State v. Hicks, 213 Ore. 619, 325 P.2d
794 (1958).
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the practical application of the defense is significantly reduced
because of the burden of proof required to be met by the de-
fendant.
The due process clause of the United States Constitution re-
quires that statutes be framed in a manner that the public will
know the kind of conduct to adhere to. The purpose is to pre-
vent the law from becoming a trap for the unwary, by providing
fair notice as to what the law will enforce. Justice Butler, speak-
ing for the Supreme Court stated that,
No one may be required at the peril of life, liberty or prop-
erty to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes..
[I]f men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, [it] violates
the first essential of due process of law.
4
Therefore, can it not be argued, as Bonfield does,3 5 that a statute
which is ignored and openly violated over a period of time is
in essence a public notice that the law is no longer enforced?
The answer seems to be involved with a consideration of whether
or not the community is bound by the laws it lives by, or only
by the laws as they are written in the statute books. They are
not always one and the same.
What protection does the individual have who cannot distinguish
between that living law which is enforced, and that written law
which is still law, but not enforced? Is he really given fair notice
as to what the law is? The problem confronting this individual,
as Bonfield explains it, is that he is unable to distinguish between
law and law.38 And yet, Rodgers points out that our legal pro-
cedure offers no example where the application of a desuetudal
act has even been nullified on grounds of fair notice."?
There are other injustices that may arise through the appli-
cation of disused statutes. Professor Bickel mentions some of these
when he states that,
The books are full of more sinister enactments, which are
used to prosecute only with exceptional, discriminatry se-
lectivity, and are used most often administratively, short of
prosecutions, to blackmail, and harass and cajole people. 88
To this the author would add that such statutes may also be
used for political purposes. Whatever avenue of abuse or mis-
34. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 806 U.S. 451, 458 (1939).
35. Bonfield, supra note 9, at 416-17.
36. Id. at 416.
87. atdgers, supra note 12, at 20.
38. Blckel, &upr note 12, at 15S.
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use these desuetudal statutes take, they no longer fulfill the pur-
pose for which they were originally intended to seve by the legis-
latures that enacted them.
Aside from the injustices that will inevitably arise in the en-
forcement of desuetudal statutes, there is still another underlying
danger. The danger is that of nurturing a social attitude that
sanctions the disobedience of the law.
Law enforcement agencies, as well as the general public, have
shown great concern over the kinds and amounts of crime being
committed in our country today. 39 They focus their attention upon
the rising number of murders, rapes, assaults, robberies and lar-
cenies.
How often do these same people display a complacency and
tolerance for their own lawlessness and lawlessness of others?
When the public observes that law is not enforced, whether desuetu-
dal or not, they are witnessing the condonation of lawbreaking.
The question is whether such observations have the effect of in-
ducing others to engage in the same form, as well as other forms
of law breaking. A more difficult and closely related question is,
what lesson is being taught to the community as a whole by a
precept and example of enforcing and obeying some of the laws
some of the time, and some of the laws, none of the time. Desuetu-
dal statutes present such a paradox. They are laws, but no one
enforces them nor obeys them for a period of time. Then once
again they become law and are enforced.
Such a policy can only lead to a general apathy for the law
and can be regarded as peculiarly damaging to the morale of
the legal system and public support for the administration of jus-
tice.40 For in a community where the "good men" cannot keep
a law that is base, some bad ones will say, 'Let us keep no law
at all' -then, where does the blame lie?" 4 1 Does it lie on the
one that enacts the law, or the one who is to enforce the law, or
the one who does not abide by the law? It may be the fault of all
three in the case of a desuetudal statute. The legislature could
have repealed it, the law enforcement agencies could have en-
forced it, and the citizen could have obeyed the law regardless
of the injustices. Interestingly enough, the citizen may have had
the least guilt, but he is the only one of the three who will bear
the burden, for he is the only one who will be prosecuted. The
question remains, does the society that allows her laws to become
obsolecent provide the impetus for a general apathy towards the
39. Address by F. 'E. Inbau, Lawlesanes8 Galore, VITAL SC MCE , Nov. 15, 1965, at
95; Crime in the U. S. Still Climbing, U. S. Nrws & WORLD REORT, Mar. 21, 1966, at 16.
40. Allen, Civil Diaobediance and the Legal Order, 36 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1, 19 (1967).
41. Id. at 178-79.
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law and a general acceptance by the community to obey only
those laws it desires to obey? The end result is civil disobedience
and no law at all.
NORTH DAKOTA
Before proceeding to discuss the case of desuetude against gam-
bling in North Dakota, it may be well to first examine the status,
past and present, of gambling in the state. Gambling is defined in
rather broad terms by the N. D. Cent. Code. It includes,
Any person who participates in any manner whatever in
any game of cards or other game of chance upon which
money or other property is wagered .... ,2
This would include all types of lotteries, raffles, or whatever term
is used. Furthermore,
Any house, building, room, vessel, float, or other place
that keeps any apparatus used or intended to be used for
any game of chance . . . is a common nuisance . . . Any
person who owns or keeps such a place . .. shall be punished
by a fine not less than $25 nor more than $1,000, and by im-
prisonment in the county jail for not more than one year. 8
To the best of this author's knowledge, there have been only
a handful of reported cases of convictions under the North Da-
kota gambing statutes." Furthermore, most of these cases date
back forty years or more.4 5 It should be noted, however, that
from time to time there have been various crackdowns on gam-
bling in the state. Whether there were convictions resulting from
these crackdowns or if these crackdowns were mere hand spank-
ing occasions, is in some instances questionable. The fact remains
that gambling has been carried out on a "lucrative 'scale."'"6 The
Assistant Attorney General of North Dakota, Paul Sand, admits
that there still is a great deal of gambling going on in the state.
It was pointed out that:
Enforcement of the anti-gambling laws could be a tough
job, because they have seldom been enforced in North
Dakota since they were written into the state Constitution
and the code years ago.'7
42. N. D. CENT. CODE 1 12-23-01 (1960).
43. N. D. CE'T. CODE § 12-23-02 (1960).
44. Middlemas v. Strutz, 71 N.D. 186, 299 N.W. 589 (1941); Erickaon v. North Dakota
State Fair Asn. of Fargo 54 N.D. 830, 211 N.W. 597 (1926); Thoreson v. Hector, 54 N.D.
651, 210 N.W. 169 (1926) ; State v. Chase and Dwyer 17 N.D. 429, 117 N.W. 587 (1908)
People v. Sponaler, 1 Dak. 277, 46 N.W. 459 (1876).
46. Id.
46. Grand Forks Herald, Jan. 19, 1962, at 3, col 1.
47. Grand Forks Herald, Sept 24, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
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The most recent attempt to enforce the gambling laws in the
state has come from Traill County. The first term State's At-
torney gave official notice that his county had until October 1,
1967, to cease all gambling activities. He explained that, "the
action is not taken because he considers lotteries morally wrong,
but because the law exists and must be enforced. ' 1 8 Professor
Bickel would argue to the contrary for,
[When an unenforced statute] is resurrected and enforced,
it represents the ad hoc decision of the prosecutor, and then
of the judge and jury, unrelated to anything that may re-
alistically be taken as present legislative policy.
49
Even where public notice of a present intent to enforce
is provided, such an action is said by Bonfield to constitute
an "executive usurpation" of legislative perogative by allowing
penal administrators to effectively create substantive criminal law. 50
The proper procedure would be a re-enactment by the legis-
lature that would truly reflect the present will of the legislature.5 1
It could be further added, that such re-enactment would also re-
flect the sentiment of the public which the Legislature is sup-
posed to represent.
Before viewing the law enforcement agencies role in this case,
two statements should be made. First, that which is discussed
here does not pertain to all law enforcement agencies now or in
the past. Secondly, one should recognize the dilemma in which these
agencies have been placed for they are expected to enforce ob-
solete statutes that the public no longer support.
Interestingly enough, the law enforcement agencies do have
the necessary machinery to enforce the gambling statutes in the
state. Under the licensing department, the Attorney General of
the state was authorized to appoint a state inspector and four dep-
uty inspectors and investigators,
[Who] shall possess the powers of police officers every-
where in the state ... and shall be authorized to investigate
and conduct investigations of any immoral or corrupt prac-
tices or violations of laws of this state .... 52
The Attorney General's licensing department has recently been in-
corporated into the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Appre-
hension. 58 The Attorney General's office, however, assures the
48. Id. at 2, col. 2.
49. Bickel, supra note 12, at 152.
50. Bonfield, supra note 9, at 423.
51. Id. at 422.
52. N.D. Sesa. Laws 1945, Ch. 288, § 1, N.D. C NT. CODS, J 54-12-12 (repealed 1967).
53. N.D. CENT. COD, } 12-60-07 (Supp. 1967).
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writer that the Bureau has the same powers as the old licens-
ing department." Pursuant to the North Dakota Century Code
§ 53-06-04, the Bureau has authority "to seize any device of any
kind, nature, description, used as a game of chance by any per-
son, firm, corporation doing business in the state."5 5 Further-
more, any "sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, policeman, and peace
officer is authorized to visit and inspect . . . and to enforce all
the provisions" related to the licensing chapter.56
Any failure to enforce such laws by such inspectors or inves-
tigators is to result in dismissal from the service.7
There have been various explanations given for the failure to
enforce the gambling laws in the state. A common explanation is
that it is difficult to get a complaint. As the Assistant Attorney
General puts it,
and if you g a m b I e in a club or other public place, you
seldom will be charged, because it is difficult to get a com-
plaint signed. 58
It should be noted that any state's attorney ort sheriff can sign a
complaint if they so desire.59  The most prevalent explanation
given is that the law need not be enforced unless the gambling
goes beyond control. This would mean, either an influx of pro-
fessionals or corrupt and cheating practices by those establish-
ments that permit gambling. Another explanation is the consid-
eration that one's own office might be at stake and to enforce
the gambling statutes might result in failure to be re-elected. Then
again, is it not also true that one's office is also in jeopardy if
there is failure to enforce the laws of the state? 60
With this sketchy and general background of gambling in the
state, let us now turn to our earlier consideration of desuetude
and its feasible application to our gambling laws. Keep in mind
that the doctrine requires more than mere disuse before a statute
is repealed. It requires that a "sufficiently prevalent and visible"
violation of the statute exist 68 for such a duration of time that the
community itself has developed a "counter law oil has established
a quasi-repeal.
' 62
It is difficult to estimate exactly what proportion of the state's
54. Letter from Attorney General's Office to R. Johnston, Oct. 23, 1967.
55. N.D. CENr. CODE, J 53-06-04 (1960).
66. N.D. CuNT. CODE, I 53-06-09 (1960).
57. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 53-06-10 (1960).
58. Supra note 47.
59. N.D. CENT. CODE, I 29-05-02 (1960).
60. N.D. CENT. CODE, 9 53-06-10 (1960).
61. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforoement, 49 IOWA L. Rav.
889, 419-20, (1964).
62. Philip, supra note 19.
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population favors gambling. If one considers the number who do
gamble,68 and the number who never express disapproval of such
activities, it appears that the community itself no longer objects to
some form of gambling. The exception as noted earlier, is the con-
sensus that such gambling should be among the local citizens and
that any influx of professional gamblers should be discouraged.
Therefore, while the people do not sanction an open and free gam-
bling state, they have expressed and have become acquiescent to
a custom or counter law that recognizes certain prescribed modes
of gambling. Such a feeling is wide spread and openly recognized
by the people of the state.
There are only several recorded instances where actual prose-
cutions have taken place.6 4 It was previously noted that there have
been various crackdowns through the years in which convictions
may or may not have taken place. (This information is unavail-
able since only North Dakota Supreme Court cases are reported.)
But as a whole, the law as it reads in the North Dakota Century
Code apparently is seldom obeyed and seldom enforced. There-
fore, is it not arguable, that our gambling statutes are guilty of
obsolesence, disuse, nonenforcement and abandonment by the gen-
eral community against whom they were to be enforced?
The weak point in the argument may lie in the question of
enforcement, for the situation has been one of partial enforce-
ment. If one accepts Bonfield's requirement that there must be
an "absolute nonenforcement," the case begins to fall.65 Then
again, if one accepts the other view that does not require absolute
omission, but rather that a counter law has arisen in the com-
munity, the argument gains ground.6
Aside from determining who wins or loses, there is another
consideration-the North Dakotan. He is the one who will pay the
price of absolesence. There are times when he may be discrim-
inated against. He may not be among the privileged who can be-
long to clubs that provide their members with a place to gamble.
Someday, he may be singled out and prosecuted at the whim of
an eager prosecutor out to set an example or acquire a political
name for himself.
More important is the resentment and apathy towards the
law that may be formulated in the minds of the people of the
state. An anonymous writer from Wahpeton made this reply when
63. Grand Forks Herald, Dec. 22, 1961 at 7, col. S. "If everyone who participates in
some form of gambling during the year was prosecuted for It, the law would have to
fence off the badlands as a prison, because none of the present facilities would hold all
the lawbreakers."
64. Case, cited note 44, .uvrG.
65. Bonfield, supra note 61, at 420.
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he observed certain clubs were allowed to gamble with apparent
official protection.
"Maybe a little money passes under the table or do you have
special friends who get favors?
8 6 7
In the same article, another individual made this comment,
With this type of law enforcement . . . you will keep North
Dakota the small thinking state that it has been for so many
years. You will not and cannot expect to attract investors
when an office like yours . . . protects the already pot-bellied,
cigar-smoking men that have laughed up their sleeves for
years while shaking dice and drinking at the club.6 8
The validity of these statements is not the important consideration,
but what is important is the reaction in the minds of these people.
Their response is not surprising. Anytime the law is discrimin-
atory or unjust in its enforcement, a suspicion of unfairness is
found. Unfairness is inherent in desuetudal laws, for their very
presence invites this kind of sporadic and discriminatory enforce-
ment. Can we expect people to have faith in a legal system that
warrants this kind of suspicion?
CONCLUSIONS
There seems to be little value in debating the usefulness of
obsolete statutes. The remaining problem is how will we handle
these statutes and the injustices that are inherent in them. First,
one may begin as this paper did, by re-evaluating the Civil Law
doctrine of desuetude. In one form or another, it may have a pos-
sible application in our own legal system. As of now, much of the
leading case law on desuetude comes from the turn of the cen-
tury.6 0 These cases were decided during a time when the prob-
lems of coping with the old legislative enactments was not yet
a reality. Today the reality exists.
A second consideration which has some merit is the one pro-
posed by Rodgers. Rodgers advocates that a new subsection be
added to the Model Penal Code which would read as follows:
(3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an
offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based
upon such conduct when:
... ; or
(c) [the accused] acts in reasonable reliance upon a
clear practice of nonenforcement of the statute or other
67. Grand Forks Herald, supra note 66.
68. Id.
69. Cases cited note 11 and 22, etra.
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enactment defining the offense by the body charged by
law with responsibility for enforcement, unless notice of
intent to enforce the statute or other enactment is rea-
sonably made available prior to the conduct alleged. 0
Such a provision, it is felt, would protect the innocent defendant
in "circumstances of manifest unfairness." 7' 1 This is progress in
the right direction, but it does not eliminate the source of the
problem which is the desuetudal statute itself. Of course, the
obvious machinery for this is the legislature. And yet, if the legis-
lature lacks the time, or if its hands are tied by the moral stigma
that would surround repealing these statutes, one may never see
their abrogation.
In summary, one should keep in mind that these are laws
that were fashioned on what is now yellow and brittle paper. On
them are stamped the rules of conduct that governed our fore-
fathers. In a time that demands change, so must our laws change
to keep pace with the demands of the community it serves. If
one has disrespect for the law in this country, it is in part due
to the law that does not reflect the will of the people. If we have
laxity on the part of our law enforcement agencies, it is in some
degree because of the obsolete laws that they are expected to
enforce.
Rudyard Kipling would sum the beginning and the end as fol-
lows:
That bids him flout the law he makes,
That bids him make the law he flouts,
Till, dazed by many doubts, he wakes
The drumming guns that-have no doubts. 2
Desuetude rest its case.
RODGER JOHNSTON
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